IS TERRORISM RETURNING TO CHILE ? In fact, did it ever go away ?

A number of violent incidents over a short period of time have shattered the placid tranquillity of the Chilean scene. They have made both local and expatriate observers wonder if the problem-free security reputation enjoyed by the country was to prove as artificial as its totally unjustified claim of having little or no corruption. A lot of discussion and soul-searching is taking place. What is really the situation ?

THE INCIDENTS

Within a couple of weeks, we have had attacks on the premises of Scotiabank, McDonalds, the state-owned Banco del Estado, and an oil pipeline. The targets were in Santiago and in the South, and with the exception of the hamburger joint which was fire-bombed, the rest was carried out with explosive (which appears to be common dynamite though contradictory versions have been given). Material damage was variable, but there were no human victims. The McDonald incident was part of a wider protest to free "political prisoners" in a particular conflictive part of Santiago, and the Banco del Estado bombing was claimed for the same purpose by a hitherto unknown group.

In fact, incidents of this nature (admittedly with lower explosive charges) have been common in Chile for years, particularly to commemorate certain "revolutionary" anniversaries linked to episodes from the struggle against the Pinochet regime. The novelty on this occasion was the concentration of the instances over a short period, and their being considered at a time of international hysteria about "terrorism", real or imagined. Political declarations and media attention on the subject have abounded.

Chile has had another festering security problem, concentrated in the

central-southern region historically the homeland of the indigenous Mapuche

groups. Protesting against what they consider unfair exploitation of their

tribal lands (mainly forestry and hydro-electric power), against a long

background of neglect and discrimination, indigenous extremists have been

attacking installations equipment of forestry companies.

COUNTER MEASURES Wary of the need to maintain a middle course between

reassuring the population and business community, as well as not creating

unnecessary concern nor worsen the situation, the authorities have been in

a quandary as to what to do. Some years ago, they had quite a bit of egg on

their face when someone invented the story of "dozens" of Iranians who had

entered the country with a view of creating terrorist unrest. They turned

out to be as real as GWB's weapons of mass destruction, and the local

security services were embarrassed (privately- the matter did not get much

public coverage). More recently, some expulsions f Arab residents from

Northern Chile were based on very tenuous evidence, if any. On this

occasion. although they have nominated a special magistrate to investigate

the Banco del Estado bombing, they have also tried to play down the whole

thing.

On the Mapuche trouble font, the government has been accused of going soft

in "not imposing the rule of law by every means", as called for by the

business community. They have indeed not sent masses of police and troops

to the area, and have kept legal sanctions to those caught at a rather low

level. They certainly do not want another Chiapas on their hands, nor the

sort of indigenous unrest that is causing havoc in the countryside of

Bolivia and Ecuador. For those who think that Chile has no indigenous

population, it might be worthwhile to note that over a million Chileans

described themselves as such in the 2002 census, in a country where it does

your work or social prospects little good.

Some think that the creation of the National Intelligence Agency (ANI)

which is winding itself through the congressional procedure, would improve

the ability to counter any unsavoury movements. The impression one gets is

that Chile is creating something which did not exist before. In fact, the

law will only enhance and restructure the efficient existing but

understaffed civilian service DISPI, increasing (moderately) its personnel

and resources. The task is made more difficult by the replacement of

traditional structured extremist movements by loser, even spontaneous

groups which are numerous, with little formal structure and therefore

harder to penetrate. This does not mean they are not trying. Years ago,

military intelligence had an expert on such movements (well at least one I

met personally) who grew his hair and beard and lived in marginal

"poblaciones" studying trends and subversive graffiti. I have also

previously written (April 2001) on the threats from student power. Military

intelligence is involved in such matters though how much they share with

the civilians remains to be seen (another theoretical aim for the ANI).

With October municipal elections just 4 months away, and the

pre-campaigning for the December 2005 presidential elections at the crucial

stage of determining the ruling coalition candidates among up to 8

potential contenders, it is also easy to make political capital out of the

situation. Chile has a long tradition of bombings, including some by "agent

provocateurs" from Right-wing groups to throw an anguished population in

the arms of the "law and order" candidates and parties. This does not mean

that the Alianza por Chile opposition would condone such acts (though

current judicial enquiries appear to show they have been condoning under

unsavoury practices), but there are always extremists who think it helps

the cause.

REAL VULNERABILITY AND OTHER RISKS IN CHILE One should start getting

seriously worried about Chile and terrorism if the sort of thing not seen

since the early 1990's starts taking place: political assassinations, the

kidnapping of major local and foreign businessmen, attacks on industrial

and touristic installations or a major gas pipe-line, or the disruption of

a high-profile international event such as the November APEC meeting.

In the meantime, if the real worry is the risk to residents and visitors.

Let it be known that the national approach to security is such as to make

the place already very dangerous. Whereas the non-wearing of seat belts

(such as killed the governor of a northern province just the other day) may

be a voluntary act (though seeing military and police personnel driving

around without seat belts raises a strong question mark about their

approach to other risks, such as properly maintaining the Hercules which

was carrying troops to Haiti but had to turn back because of mechanical

trouble), other examples of neglect have killed or wounded several people

recently. This included the death of a young boy in a Santiago building

whose gas supply as declared faulty but not repaired, the injury of a

father and daughter on a badly maintained ride at a fun fair in the poshest

part of Santiago, the escape of a lion from an unauthorised circus in a

poor part of town (you see how democratic is carelessness in Chilean

society). There are plenty of land mines around Torres del Paine, one of

the country's main tourist attractions. Last but not least, a report on

major Latin American towns just published by the American Medical

Association singles out Santiago as the capital where non-smoking

restrictions are the least enforced. So, without any help from Karl Marx or

Che Guevara, living in or visiting Chile can be dangerous indeed.

TRANSPARENCY

As a closing anecdote, I recently made a direct approach to civilian and military authorities in order to get details of a system which is designed to add "transparency" to a certain procedure related to defence. Though I finally managed to get the information though other means, none of the authorities directly involved approached even acknowledged the request.